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Introduction
Cybersecurity attacks on information technology (IT) 
systems are becoming increasingly frequent and soph-
isticated (Bailey et al., 2014). Critical infrastructures – 
the assets essential for the functioning of a society and 
economy (Public Safety Canada, 2009) such as power 
generation and distribution, transportation systems, 
healthcare services, and financial systems – are increas-
ingly reliant on networked IT systems (Rahman et al., 
2011; Xiao-Juan & Li-Zhen, 2010). Securing these inter-
connected IT systems from cyber-attack is thus of grow-
ing concern to many stakeholders (Merkow & 
Raghavan, 2012). Security experts argue that security 
should be “designed in” to critical systems upfront, 
rather than retrofitted later (Hughes & Cybenko, 2013; 
McGraw, 2006; Pfleeger et al., 2015).
Cybersecurity capability maturity models (e.g., Caralli 
et al., 2010; NIST, 2014; U.S. Department of Energy, 
2014) are one approach used by organizations to assess 
capability to defend against cyberattacks, benchmark 
cybersecurity capability against others, and identify cy-
bersecurity capabilities to improve (Miron & Muita, 
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2014). Like the maturity models in other specialized do-
mains, cybersecurity capability maturity models help 
organizations to measure their current processes 
against established industry standards. However, cur-
rent cybersecurity capability maturity models over-
whelmingly focus on evaluating how organizations 
protect existing systems (i.e., processes to maintain cy-
bersecurity) rather than evaluating how organizations 
securely develop and deploy new secure information 
systems (i.e., processes to create cybersecurity).
New IT systems are typically developed and deployed 
as IT projects (Phillips, 2010), which are managed using 
project management practices (PMI, 2013a). IT projects 
provide a one-time opportunity to "design in" cyberse-
curity to the new IT systems deployed within critical in-
frastructures. Although the project management 
domain has its own maturity models (e.g., Sowden et al. 
2013; PMI, 2013b), the project management models in 
use today do not explicitly address cybersecurity. For 
providers of critical infrastructures and their stakehold-
ers, this is both a gap and an opportunity.
This article makes three contributions to the theory and 
practice of securing critical infrastructures. First, it de-
velops the argument that cybersecurity can and should 
be a concern of the IT project managers and project 
sponsors of critical infrastructure IT projects, and that 
project management maturity models could be exten-
ded to assess cybersecurity capability in the same way 
that these models assess other capability domains. 
Second, it identifies six cybersecurity themes that are 
salient to IT project management. It accomplishes this 
by selecting three cybersecurity capability maturity 
models, examining the content and areas of commonal-
ity, and identifying those aspects that overlap with the 
scope of IT project management or are likely to be im-
pacted by project management decisions and activities. 
The themes therefore reflect both building secure sys-
tems and also building systems in secure way. The 
three models examined are: i) the National Institute of 
Science and Technology (NIST) framework for improv-
ing critical infrastructure cybersecurity, ii) the United 
States Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity Capability 
Maturity Model (C2M2), and iii) the CERT Resilience 
Management Model (CERT RMM). Third, it selects a 
project management maturity model – the PjM3 – and 
proposes a new five-level cybersecurity capability per-
spective that augments the seven capability perspect-
ives of the standard model. Bringing together 
cybersecurity capability maturity models and the PjM3 
project management maturity model provides critical 
infrastructure organizations with the means to evaluate 
capability in upstream “cybersecurity creation”. This 
approach will be especially useful for organizations that 
highly value security and concurrently employ cyberse-
curity capability maturity models to evaluate capability 
in downstream “cybersecurity maintenance”.
The body of this article is structured as four sections. 
The next three sections each develop one of the article’s 
three contributions and the fourth section concludes.
Securing the IT Project
IT systems within critical infrastructures typically ori-
ginate as IT projects (Phillips, 2010). Unlike operations, 
which are continuous and on-going, projects have a 
specific set of objectives and well-defined and finite 
time boundaries (Kerzner, 2013). IT development and 
deployment activities are typically managed using pro-
ject management tools and techniques, such as those of 
the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK; 
PMI, 2013a), and an IT project management process 
with well-defined stages and gates between stages (Phil-
lips, 2010). 
Decisions and activities within an IT project are likely 
to have a lasting impact on cybersecurity. Procurement 
and supply chain management are one example. Out-
sourced design services, purchase of commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) software, and the adoption of open 
source software components are all potential sources of 
vulnerabilities that are difficult to detect and correct 
later (Ellison et al., 2010). Quality management is a 
second example. Defects in design, deployment, or pro-
visioning during the IT project could be exploitable un-
til detected and corrected – potentially throughout the 
active lifecycle of the IT system. The security of the pro-
ject office and the project infrastructure is also of last-
ing impact. The tools and processes used for project 
work, document management, and communication 
within the project team are all components of informa-
tion security and integrity. For example, project arti-
facts thought to be private could be a goldmine to 
attackers for future social engineering attacks. Thus, IT 
projects provide a one-time opportunity to securely 
"design in" cybersecurity to the new IT systems de-
ployed within critical infrastructures.
Capability maturity models approach an activity as a 
process and formally compare the characteristics of the 
process in use against the characteristics of an “ideal” 
process (Humphrey, 1988). This approach originated in 
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software engineering and has been widely applied in 
many specialized domains, including cybersecurity 
(Miron & Muita, 2014), capacity to leverage open 
source software (Carbone, 2007), and enterprise-readi-
ness of open source software projects (Golden, 2008). 
Project management maturity models are the subset of 
capability maturity models that focus specifically on 
project management capabilities. A body of empirical 
evidence associates the use of project management 
standards, processes, and maturity models with posit-
ive project outcomes (Brookes, 2009; Milosevic & Pa-
tanakul, 2005).
The two most developed and widely deployed project 
management maturity models are:
1. PjM3, the project management component of the 
Portfolio, Programme, and Project Management Ma-
turity Model (P3M3), maintained by a public–private 
partnership with the United Kingdom government 
(Sowden et al., 2013) 
2. OPM3, the Organizational Project Management Ma-
turity Model, developed and maintained by the Pro-
ject Management Institute (PMI, 2013b)
In addition, there are many derivatives of both base 
models. For example, the PRINCE2 Maturity Model is a 
specialized derivative of the P3M3 that is specifically 
aligned with the PRINCE2 (Projects IN Controlled Envir-
onments, version 2) project management methodology 
(Office of Government Commerce, 2009).
Both of these models and their various derivatives ad-
dress the management of project risks, but none expli-
citly address cybersecurity. Nonetheless, cybersecurity 
capability could be assessed at the same time and in 
the same way as other areas of concern within the 
scope of project management.
The remainder of this article focuses exclusively on the 
PjM3 project management capability maturity model. 
There are three reasons for selecting the PjM3 rather 
than a different model. First, the PjM3 is the most 
widely used model internationally (Young et al., 2011). 
Second, the PjM3 provides a discrete five-level score in 
seven perspectives (Sowden et al., 2013); discrete and 
modular models are more easily extensible for our pur-
poses than, for example, the continuous scores of the 
OPM3. Third, the PjM3 is not explicitly connected with 
any particular project management framework or pro-
cess (Sowden et al., 2013); it is thus more widely applic-
able than specialized models such as PRINCE2. 
Nonetheless, much of what follows about the PjM3 
could be readily adapted to other project management 
models by repeating the steps described here.
The PjM3 is the project management component of the 
P3M3 – a broader maturity model that also addresses 
portfolio management and program management. The 
P3M3 was developed in 2006 by the Office of Govern-
ment Commerce in the United Kingdom (OGC, 2006) 
and was most recently updated in 2013 by Axelos, a 
private–public partnership with the United Kingdom 
government (Sowden et al., 2013). It originated as an 
enhancement to OGC’s Project Management Maturity 
Model, which had been adapted from the original Cap-
ability Maturity Model (CMM) developed by the Soft-
ware Engineering Institute (SEI) in the United States 
(Humphrey, 1988). P3M3 has been adopted in both gov-
ernment and private organizations. For example, the 
Australian Department of Finance and Deregulation 
mandated P3M3 as the common methodology to evalu-
ate Australian government agencies and assess their or-
ganizational capability to commission, manage, and 
realize benefits from ICT-enabled investments (Young 
et al., 2011). 
The PjM3 assesses capability within seven process per-
spectives (Sowden et al., 2013): i) management control, 
ii) benefits management, iii) financial management, iv) 
stakeholder engagement, v) risk management, vi) or-
ganizational governance, and vii) resource manage-
ment. Similar to other process maturity models, each 
perspective is independently assessed at one of five 
levels: awareness of process (level 1), repeatable pro-
cess (level 2), defined process (level 3), managed pro-
cess (level 4), and optimized process (level 5). Each 
level and each process perspective has embedded at-
tributes. Generic attributes relate to all process perspect-
ives at a maturity level. Specific attributes relate only to 
a particular process perspective. Thus the PjM3 is po-
tentially extensible with new perspectives that employ 
the same structure and five-level measurement scale, 
and provide specific attributes for each maturity level.
Cybersecurity Capabilities
There is an extensive body of prior work on cybersecur-
ity and on critical infrastructure that can inform a cy-
bersecurity perspective on IT project management. 
Miron and Muita (2014) previously identified nine pub-
lished cybersecurity capability maturity models for crit-
ical infrastructures. These nine models were published 
by five different organizations, with a variety of stated 
purposes. We employed the following steps to select 
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three models for further examination. First, we scored 
each of the models identified by Miron and Muita 
(2014) in five areas: i) maturity and stability of author-
ing organizations; ii) experience in maturity modelling 
of authoring organizations; iii) the accessibility of de-
tailed documentation; iv) publishing in the public do-
main or under open licenses; v) sufficient prescription 
of framework. Second, we employed three selection cri-
teria: i) high scores in the five areas, ii) no more than 
one model from any one publisher, and iii) where two 
models received similar scores, we favoured the more 
general model or base model over a specialized or deriv-
ative model. This selection process was intended to se-
lect on both quality and diversity. 
The following three cybersecurity capability maturity 
models were selected for further analysis:
1. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) 
published by the United States Department of En-
ergy (2014). The first C2M2 model was introduced in 
2012, focused specifically on the energy subsector 
(ES-C2M2). It was updated most recently to version 
1.1 in February 2014, and two new variants were 
launched: a basic sector-neutral version (C2M2; the 
version used here), and a version tailored to the oil 
and natural gas subsector (ONG-C2M2). Develop-
ment was led by the United States Department of En-
ergy (DoE) in partnership with the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and in col-
laboration with public and private sector experts. 
C2M2 is structured as ten domains, each comprising 
a set of cybersecurity practices – the activities that an 
organization can perform to establish and grow cap-
ability in the domain. 
2. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework from the Nation-
al Institute of Science and Technology (NIST, 2014). 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework was developed 
in response to a February 2013 executive order from 
the United States President to “enhance the security 
and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure 
and to maintain a cyber environment that encour-
aged efficiency, innovation, and economic prosper-
ity” (The President, 2013). It identifies a set of general 
principles and best practices to guide organizations 
to develop their own individual readiness profiles.
3. The CERT Resilience Management Model (CERT-
RMM) from the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) 
at Carnegie Mellon University (Caralli et al. 2010). 
CERT-RMM was the first security model to adopt a 
capability maturity perspective. Beginning with the 
first drafts circulated in 2008, and now at version 1.1 
(2010), the CERT-RMM was developed as the founda-
tion for a process improvement approach to opera-
tional resilience management. It identifies 
organizational practices necessary to manage opera-
tional resilience and to respond to stress with mature 
and predictable performance.
Table 1 provides a summary of the content and main 
concerns of each of the three cybersecurity models. 
There are commonalities among all three models, con-
cerns that are prominent in two of the three models, 
and unique concerns that are found in one model only.
Next, we systematically identified the cybersecurity 
concerns from Table 1 that are most salient to IT pro-
ject management. We eliminated concerns that we 
deemed as purely operational and retained those con-
cerns that either i) overlap with the scope of IT project 
management or ii) are likely to be impacted by project 
management decisions and activities. Finally, we 
grouped the remaining concerns into broad thematic 
areas, identifying six project-applicable cybersecurity 
themes:
1. Project environment security
2. Workforce security knowledge
3. Business continuity planning
4. Secure project supply chain
5. Project deliverable security
6. Project deliverable resiliency
These six themes provide a potential basis for a cyberse-
curity perspective on project management capability 
maturity. 
Cybersecurity Extensions to the PjM3
To identify the specific attributes of a PjM3 cybersecur-
ity perspective, we re-interpreted the six themes at each 
of the five levels of generic process-maturity attributes. 
By employing the same structure and measurement 
scale, we ensure that the new cybersecurity perspective 
is fully compatible with the seven standard perspect-
ives of the PjM3, and can be assessed at the same time 
and in the same way as the standard perspectives. 
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The specific attributes at each of the five maturity 
levels, are provided in the following five subsections. 
Level 1: Awareness 
1. There are no cybersecurity training or skills require-
ments for any project team members. 
2. There is no project role responsible for cybersecurity. 
3. There is no access or identity control performed on 
system environments used by the project team. 
4. There are no cybersecurity requirements maintained 
for projects. 
5. Project cybersecurity processes such as Statements of 
Sensitivity (SoS), Threat Risk Assessment (TRA), and 
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) are not performed 
or are performed in an inconsistent, ad hoc manner. 
6. Secure software development practices (e.g., code 
scans, penetration testing, OWASP) are neither 
planned nor performed. 
7. Projects do not subscribe to organizational procure-
ment standards or processes. 
Table 1. Content and main concerns of the C2M2, CERT-RMM, and NIST frameworks. 
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Level 2: Repeatable 
1. Some team members have cybersecurity skills, but 
they are applied inconsistently throughout the team. 
2. Project documentation is created, but there are no 
processes to maintain or control project documents 
or code. 
3. Each project is responsible for ensuring appropriate 
identity and access management of project system 
environments. 
4. Cybersecurity requirements are developed in an in-
consistent and ad hoc manner. 
5. Project cybersecurity processes (i.e., SoS, PIA, TRA, 
etc.) are employed in an inconsistent and ad hoc 
manner. 
6. Secure software development practices (e.g., code 
scans, penetration testing, OWASP) are employed in 
an inconsistent manner across projects. 
7. Business Continuity Plans are inconsistently em-
ployed by projects and rarely maintained. 
Level 3: Defined 
1. Cybersecurity skills are included in the job descrip-
tions of key design, development, and testing roles. 
2. Security screening of project resources is performed. 
3. Project documentation and code is actively main-
tained in a secure repository. 
4. A project role is identified as responsible for the cy-
bersecurity of project deliverable(s). 
5. There are defined processes for access and identity 
control of all system environments used by the pro-
ject team. 
6. Enterprise cybersecurity requirements are defined at 
the organizational level and are mandatory for all IT 
projects. 
7. Checklists containing the details of all project cyber-
security processes (i.e., SoS, PIA, TRA, etc.) are avail-
able to all project team members. 
8. Project standards for secure software development 
are defined and available to all team members. 
9. Project standards for secure management of docu-
mentation and code exist and are available to all pro-
ject team members. 
10. Corporate procurement processes are employed by 
projects and all transactions are auditable. 
11. Business Continuity Plan templates are made avail-
able to all project team members. 
Level 4: Managed 
1. Key design, development, and testing resources hold 
verifiable cybersecurity skills credentials. 
2. Access and identity management configurations of 
project systems environments are consistently 
audited to ensure environment security and integrity. 
3. All requirements documents are reviewed by an enter-
prise cybersecurity architect. 
4. Phase containment exists to ensure that all project cy-
bersecurity processes and standards (i.e., SoS, PIA, 
TRA, secure software development, Business Continu-
ity Plans, etc.) are appropriately employed by each 
project and are of appropriate quality. 
5. Projects only use qualified vendors who are, among 
other things, evaluated for security risk. 
Level 5: Optimizing 
1. Resources for improving cybersecurity skills that per-
tain to project work are made readily available to the 
entire project team. 
2. A corporate Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence exists 
to continually improve the cybersecurity capability of 
project teams. 
3. Corporate standards for project cybersecurity pro-
cesses are continuously improved and actively com-
municated. 
4. Corporate practices for secure software development 
are continuously improved and actively communic-
ated. 
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5. Projects actively use their experience to contribute to 
corporate cybersecurity knowledge. 
6. Enterprise cybersecurity requirements are continu-
ously reviewed and improved by a Corporate Cyber-
security Centre of Excellence. 
7. An enterprise security architect is required to sign-off 
on all major project deliverables. 
8. Project documentation and code are maintained in a 
secure repository with strict version control. 
9. All project documentation and code artifacts have 
only one copy, which is maintained in a secure repos-
itory. 
10. Qualified vendors are continuously evaluated for se-
curity risk.
The cybersecurity perspective on project management 
capability maturity demonstrates the potential relation-
ship between IT project management and cybersecur-
ity of critical infrastructures. Much of the existing work 
on securing critical infrastructures, including the vari-
ous cybersecurity maturity models, has emphasized on-
going operations. However, we suggest that an 
emphasis on operations addresses only half of the cy-
bersecurity challenge, and we argue that the IT projects 
that design and deploy new IT systems also require at-
tention. Cybersecurity extensions to project manage-
ment maturity models – such as the PjM3 cybersecurity 
perspective proposed above – address the introduction 
of new systems in a way that will be familiar to experi-
enced project managers and project sponsors.
Conclusion
As cybersecurity becomes an increasing area of con-
cern for critical infrastructure providers, governments, 
and private enterprise, it warrants greater attention 
from IT project managers, project management offices, 
and project sponsors. We have argued that IT projects 
provide an opportunity to securely “design in” cyberse-
curity to the information systems components of critic-
al infrastructures; thus, cybersecurity can and should 
be a main concern of IT project managers. A cyberse-
curity perspective on project management maturity ad-
dresses this opportunity in a form that is familiar to 
project practitioners. 
Although this work is presented here at an early stage 
and has not yet been proven in the field, we sincerely 
hope that it sparks a dialogue between IT project practi-
tioners, cybersecurity professionals, and providers of 
critical infrastructures on how to more effectively se-
cure the systems that are essential for the functioning 
of our society and our economy.
Successful implementation will require action by mul-
tiple groups. We call upon IT project managers and pro-
ject staff to try out these ideas in the field – beginning 
with informal self-assessments of cybersecurity matur-
ity and followed by action plans to raise scores – and 
then to report back on their experiences. We call upon 
critical infrastructure project sponsors to provide IT 
project managers and project teams with the authority, 
incentives, training, and resources to “design in” cyber-
security to IT projects and assess the maturity of those 
efforts. We call upon researchers to empirically test the 
efficacy of these ideas, particularly the relationships 
between IT project cybersecurity attributes and high-
impact outcomes, including traditional project out-
comes, security outcomes, and operational outcomes. 
If evidence from the field shows this approach to be ef-
fective, adoption on a larger scale will require actions 
from project management organizations to incorporate 
cybersecurity more formally into the Pj3M and other 
project management standards. This formalization 
would open up new revenue opportunities for pro-
viders of training services, for providers of certification 
and assessment services, and for providers of project 
tools and infrastructure, and it would accelerate the ca-
reers of qualified project professions who are capable of 
operating at a high maturity score on the cybersecurity 
perspective.
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